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How to Set Up a Passkey in Telegram

A passkey lets you sign in with the same face, fingerprint or device unlock you already use for everything else, instead of waiting for a code and…

  • LevelL2
In this article
  1. key The attack it removes
  2. key_off What happens when you lose the device
  3. settings Setting one up
  4. At a glance
play_circle Video tip • Security

A passkey lets you sign in with the same face, fingerprint or device unlock you already use for everything else, instead of waiting for a code and typing it in. It is created once, stored by your phone or computer's own password manager, and offered when you next log in.

The security benefit is narrow, specific and larger than it sounds: there is no longer a code for anybody to talk you into reading out.

What you will be able to do

  • check_circle Create a passkey and sign in with it.
  • check_circle Say exactly which attack it stops.
  • check_circle Keep the protections it does not replace.
  • check_circle Plan for losing the device it lives on.
play_circle Official Telegram video short — setting up a passkey
1080p clip from @TelegramTips • 0:12

Creating one is a single confirmation — the interesting part is what it does and does not cover.

key The attack it removes

Nearly every account taken on this platform is taken the same way. Somebody is contacted by a person who seems plausible, a login is started on the attacker's device, a code arrives, and the code is read out or typed into the wrong place. That is it. No software is broken and nothing is guessed — a person is persuaded to hand over a number.

A passkey removes the number. There is nothing to read aloud, nothing to forward, nothing that can be typed into a convincing imitation of a login screen, because the proof is produced by your device and never leaves it in a form anybody else can use. Against the actual threat, that is a substantial improvement rather than a convenience.

What it does not do is make the account safe from everything, and the rest of this page is about the three protections people assume it has taken over. Keeping them is the difference between a stronger account and a differently shaped weak one.

fingerprint
Your face or fingerprint does not leave the device The biometric unlocks the key stored on your phone or computer; it is not sent anywhere and it is not what proves who you are. That is why a passkey is not a password with a picture of you attached to it.
devices Interactive

Four things people think it replaces

It replaces one of them. Knowing which is the whole of this page.

verified_user Replaced — and this is the point

check_circle The code is the weak part of the whole system, because it is a secret that has to travel through a person. Removing the person removes the attack.
check_circle It also fixes the case where somebody else can see your messages — a shared device, a synced tablet, a message preview on a lock screen.
check_circle And it is faster, which matters more than it should: convenience is why people leave protections switched on.
cancel The code route usually still exists as a fallback, so the old attack is not impossible — it is merely no longer your normal way in, and you will notice a code arriving that you did not ask for.

One layer is genuinely improved. The other three are exactly as important as they were yesterday.

key_off What happens when you lose the device

The passkey is kept by your phone or computer's own credential manager, which usually means it is synced with the account behind that device rather than trapped on the handset. That is convenient and it moves a dependency: the security of your messaging account now partly rests on the security of that platform account.

Worth acting on in two ways. Protect that account properly, because it now unlocks more than it used to. And make sure you would still have a route in without it — the phone number, the cloud password, a working recovery address. Every account that becomes unrecoverable does so because somebody removed the old way in before checking the new one covered everything.

If you use a separate hardware key rather than the built-in manager, the same logic applies with sharper edges: the key is a physical object, and a second registered way in is not optional.

gpp_maybe
Nobody will ever need your passkey There is nothing about it that can be shared, so any request to approve a login, confirm a prompt, or authenticate for somebody else is an attempt to have you sign in on their behalf. The correct response to an unexpected prompt is always to decline it.

settings Setting one up

  1. Turn on two-step verification first If it is not already on.
  2. Open the privacy and security settings The passkey option is there.
  3. Create it and confirm with your device unlock One prompt.
  4. Check your recovery email still works Before you rely on anything.
  5. Protect the account that stores it It now unlocks more.
  6. Decline any prompt you did not start Nobody needs yours.
menu_book
Part of the beginner curriculum Step 36 — Two-step verification and recovery

This page improves the way you sign in. The curriculum step is the layer underneath it: the cloud password, the recovery address, and what actually happens when you are locked out of your own account.

Summary

At a glance

  1. 1Passkey

    Sign in with your device instead of a code.

  2. 2No code to steal

    There is no code for anyone to trick you into sharing.

  3. 3Keep the password

    Two-Step Verification still protects your account.

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